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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction
to hear this Appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iii)
and § 78-2-2(3)(j).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In 1985, the Division of State Lands and Forestry (the
"Division") demanded that Trail Mountain Coal Company ("Trail
Mountain") retroactively pay royalties under State Coal Lease
No. 22603 (the "Lease") at the rate of 8% of the value of coal
sold.

The Division also demanded significant interest and

penalties for the alleged underpayment of royalties during the
period from 1979 through 1985. Trail Mountain filed a
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against the defendants
(hereinafter collectively the "State") challenging the State's
demand for retroactive payment of royalties.

Each party filed

a Motion for Summary Judgment based on extensive stipulated
facts.

The Seventh Judicial District Court of Emery County,

Bunnell, J., granted Trail Mountain's Motion for Summary
Judgment against the State.
the District Court.

The State appeals the Judgment of

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The dispositive issues presented for review on this
appeal are as followsr1
1.

Whether the royalty provision in the Lease is

ambiguous?
2.

Whether the royalty provision regarding payment

of an alternate royalty amount is self-executing?
3.

Whether the royalty provision should be enforced

in accordance with the parties1 past interpretation and course
of conduct?
4.

Whether the District Court properly considered

the law regarding school trust lands in entering its Judgment?

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Utah Enabling Act § 10:
That the proceeds of lands herein granted
for educational purposes, except as

1

Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court, Trail Mountain submits its own Statement of Issues
In view of the fact that the State has not assigned
error to the District Court's decision regarding interest and
penalties, Trail Mountain will not address that issue. The
District Court held that "the State had no right under the Lease
to impose interest, except on delinquent payments at the legal
rate, or any penalty. A legally binding lease cannot be altered
or added to by by [sic] rules and regulations adopted
subsequently." (R. 657-658)

-2-

hereinafter otherwise provided, shall
constitute a permanent school fund, the
interest of which only shall be expended for
the support of said schools, and such land
shall not be subject to pre-emption,
homestead entry, or any other entry under
the land laws of the United States, whether
surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be
surveyed for school purposes only.
Utah Constitution, Article XX, §

1:

All lands of the State that have been, or
may hereafter be granted to the State by
Congress, and all lands acquired by gift,
grant or devise, from any person or
corporation, or that may otherwise be
acquired, are hereby accepted, and declared
to be the public lands of the State; and
shall be held in trust for the people, to be
disposed of as may be provided by law, for
the respective purposes for which they have
been or may be granted, donated, devised or
otherwise acquired.
Utah Code Ann., § 75-7-406:
With respect to a third person dealing with
a trustee or assisting a trustee in the
conduct of a transaction, the existence of
trust power and their proper exercise by the
trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The
third person is not bound to inquire whether
the trustee has power to act or is properly
exercising the power; and a third person,
without actual knowledge that the trustee is
exceeding his powers or improperly
exercising them, is fully protected in
dealing with the trustee as if the trustee
possessed and properly exercised the powers
he purports to exercise. A third person is
not bound to assure the proper application
of trust assets paid or delivered to the
trustee.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Trail Mountain and its predecessors mined coal under
the Lease during the period from 1979 through 1985.
(R. 669,672)

The State furnished Trail Mountain a blank

printed form entitled Coal Production and Settlement
Transmittal on which to report quarterly production
information, royalty rate, and certain other information, and
upon which to calculate the amount of royalty payable to the
State.

(R. 675-676)

Each Coal Production and Settlement

Transmittal submitted during the period, plus each royalty
check or check stub, reflected that royalties were calculated
and paid by Trail Mountain at the rate of 15?5 per ton.
676)

(R.

Each Coal Production and Settlement Transmittal submitted

by Trail Mountain from 1979 through 1985 was received by the
State without objection.

(R. 676)

Each royalty check

submitted by Trail Mountain from 1979 through 1985 was received
and cashed by the State without objection.

(R. 676)

The Coal Production and Settlement Transmittals
received by the State were routinely reviewed by John T. Blake,
Mineral Resources Specialist, during the period from 1979
through 1985.

(R. 677-678)

He made a determination that each

payment was correct in light of the production.

(R. 678)

In March of 1985, the State undertook an audit of the
royalty payments of Trail Mountain.

(R. 679)

The State

concluded that royalties had not been paid in accordance with
the terms of the Lease, and that royalties had been underpaid.
-4-

(R. 679)

The State made this same determination in regard to

all other similar State Coal Leases under which royalties had
been paid at the rate of 15?f per ton during this same period.
(R. 680)
As part of the audit program, an Audit Committee was
formed to review the audits.

(R. 680)

The members of the

Audit Committee had differing views as to whether or not the
coal lessees had paid the proper royalty amounts under the
various State Coal Leases; and whether or not the State should
demand payment of royalties at a higher rate.
however, approved the audit report.

The Committee,

(R. 681)

By letter dated October 15, 1985, the State provided
Trail Mountain with a copy of the audit, and made demand for
unpaid royalties, interest, and penalties of $5,222,197.20.
(R. 681-682)

Trail Mountain appealed to the Director of the

Division of State Lands and Forestry (the "Director"),
disputing the report's conclusions and requesting a
redetermination of the matter.
appeal.

(R. 683-684)

The Director denied the

Trail Mountain then filed this action

seeking declaratory relief against the defendants, and
challenging the State's demand for retroactive payment of
royalties.
This dispute centers on the royalty provision of the
Lease which requires the lessee:

-5-

To pay lessor quarterly, on or before the
15th day of the month succeeding each
quarter, royalty
(a) at the rate of 15«5 per ton of
2,000 lbs. of coal produced from the leased
premises and sold or otherwise disposed of,
or
(b) at the rate prevailing at the
beginning of the quarter for which payment
is being made, for federal lessees of land
of similar character under coal leases
issued by the United States at that time,
whichever is higher . . . .(R. 665)
The District Court found that the royalty provision is
ambiguous, and that the parties construed the provision over
the years as requiring the payment of royalties at the rate of
15gi per ton,

(R. 653-655)

That decision was based upon

findings that (1) the State accepted royalties at the 15^ per
ton rate; (R. 251, 792) and, (2) that the State by an
established course of conduct for many years adopted a
construction of the Lease that 15^5 per ton was the proper
royalty rate.

(R. 655, 793-794)

The State claims that during

the period in question, the federal prevailing rate was 8% of
sales value, and that Trail Mountain was required to pay
royalties at that rate.

(Appellants' Brief pp. 21, 22)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
L

The royalty provision in the Lease is ambiguous

as a matter of law.

Numerous terms and phrases of the royalty
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provision are susceptible of two or more meanings.

The

provision is incomplete, vague, and is missing essential
terms.

There is no objective standard for application of the

alternate royalty provision, and the Lease fails to specify the
rights and duties of the parties in relation thereto.

The

Lease is ambiguous by defendant's own admissions.
2.

The Court should look to the past interpretation

and course of conduct of the parties in determining how to
apply the royalty provision.

The parties* course of

performance demonstrates that they construed the Lease as
requiring payment of royalties at the rate of 15^ per ton.
3.

The State is estopped from retroactively

assessing royalty other than at the rate of 15<zf per ton.
4.

The State's assertions regarding trust land law

and policy are inapposite.

The trust received the full value

of royalties provided for in the Lease.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE ROYALTY PROVISION IN THE LEASE IS AMBIGUOUS.
Terms which are susceptible of various meanings render

a contract ambiguous.
(Utah 1962).

Russell v. Valentine, 376 P.2d 548

See also Jones v. Acme Building Products. Inc.,

450 P.2d 743, 746-747 (Utah 1969); Gibbs v. Erbert, 424 P.2d
276 (Kan. 1967); and 7-G Ranching Company v. Stites, 419 P.2d
358, 361 (Ariz. App. 1966).
-7-

A.

The Term "rate prevailing" is ambiguous because
it is susceptible of different meanings.

Does the "rate prevailing" mean an average of royalty
rates in various leases, or the rate used in a numerical
majority of leases?

How many leases should be taken into

account when determining the rate prevailing, and which leases
should be used to make this determination?
The Lease also fails to specify who should determine
the "rate prevailing." Is the State or Trail Mountain
responsible for calculating the "rate prevailing"?

This

omission renders the term ambiguous because it could be
interpreted to mean that either or both of the parties was
responsible for the calculation.
B.

The term "land of similar character" is ambiguous
because it is susceptible of different meanings.

The Lease refers to "federal lessees of land of
similar character." The phrase is ambiguous for two reasons:
(1) it does not set forth the factors to be considered in
determining "land of similar character";

and, (2) it does not

indicate who is responsible for making that determination.
The Legislative General Counsel has concluded that:
As used in Article III, SECOND, (c), of the
attached lease, the term "land of similar
character" is so vague as to defy reasonable
definition. Initially the problem becomes
one of kind, i.e. similar in what
regard—size, productivity, value.
Assuming, arguendo, that similarity can be
established, the second problem arises when
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it is attempted to establish the magnitude
of the lands available for comparison i.e.
does the land have to be similar to land in
the same county, state, region or is the
entire United States available for
comparative similarities.
Without further explanation in the lease
itself or without knowing the intent of the
parties, any definition given herein would
be totally inconclusive.
Legislative General Counsel Opinion No. 077-010, April 8,
1977.

(R. 666, 398-399) (emphasis added).
Representations by the State demonstrate that it was

uncertain as to the meaning of this term.

In an October 4,

1976 letter from the Division to John L. Bell in response to
Mr. Bell's questions concerning the royalty provision, the
Division stated "that the royalty can be changed to the rate
payable under Federal leases in the same area".
(emphasis added).

(R. 666, 394)

There is no authority for the Division's

assumption that "land of similar character" means land in the
"same area."
Approximately one month later, the State admitted that
it had not made a formal determination of what "land of similar
character" meant.

In a letter dated November 18, 1976 from the

Division to Mr. Bell, the Division stated that:

"The State has

never made a formal decision on this because we have not yet
been faced with the problem."

(R. 666, 396)

In the same

letter, the Division stated that they "would probably recommend
to the Land Board that same area be interpreted to mean a
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particular drainage area . . . ." The letter concluded with the
caveat, "[h]owever, I should impress that this is only a Staff
recommendation . . . ." (R. 666, 396)
Further, since the "rate prevailing" is determined by
reference to "land of similar character", the ambiguity is
compounded.
C.

The phrase "coal leases issued by the United
States at that time" is ambiguous because it is
susceptible of different meanings.

The Lease states that royalty should be paid "at the
rate prevailing, at the beginning of the quarter for which
payment is being made for federal lessees of land of similar
character under coal leases issued by the United States at that
time. . . . "

(R. 665, 390)

The phrase "coal leases issued by

the United States at that time" could be interpreted to mean
those leases issued only at the beginning of the quarter, or
those issued during the quarter, or any previously issued lease
in existence at the beginning of the quarter.
D.

The Lease is ambiguous by the State's own
admissions.

The Director of the Division, Ralph A. Miles, has
admitted that there was not unanimity of opinion among the
members of the Division's Audit Committee as to how the royalty
provision should be interpreted.

(R. 533-534, 681)

Mr. Miles has unequivocally admitted that the royalty
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Further,

provision was ambiguous, and required some interpretation.
(R. 534) Mr. Miles was the head of the State agency which
administered these leases during most of the relevant period.
Donald G. Prince, Assistant Director of the Division,
has stated that he was of the opinion that the 15<zf per ton
royalty was the proper royalty as of February 17, 1981, the
date the Lease was assigned to Trail Mountain.

(R. 544)

Mr. Prince also interpreted the Lease to give the Board of
State Lands the ability to change the royalty rate but only
prospectively, and not retroactively.

(R. 546)

Both of these

interpretations are directly contrary to the State's present
interpretation.
John T. Blake, a Mineral Resources Specialist with the
Division, had responsibility for administering the Trail
Mountain Lease.

(R. 251, 547-548) Mr. Blake believes that the

15?{ per ton royalty was the proper amount during the period in
question.

(R. 550)

He also acknowledges that he has

a different interpretation of the Lease than the Division now
supports.

(R. 550)

In fact, Mr. Blake has stated that the

royalty provision is ambiguous.
E.

(R. 551)

The Lease is ambiguous because it is incomplete,
vague, missing terms and facially deficient.

A contract is ambiguous if it is vague and uncertain.
Winegar v. Smith Investment Co., 590 P.2d 348 (Utah 1979).
Lease is vague, uncertain and incomplete because it does not
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The

define critical terms, and fails to provide a mechanism for
applying the alternate royalty provision.

The Lease fails to

provide any objective standard with respect to:

(1) which of

the two royalty provisions is applicable; (2) what triggers the
change from one provision to another; (3) when the change from
one provision to another should be made; (4) which party is
responsible for determining when a change should be made; (5)
which party is responsible for determining the "rate
prevailing"; (6) how the "rate prevailing" should be
calculated; (7) what "land of similar character" means; and,
(8) whether a change would be automatic or whether notice is
required.
Thus, the royalty provision of the Lease does not
provide a clear understanding as to each party's rights and
duties under the contract.
F.

The parties' disagreement itself creates an
ambiguity.

The disagreement of the parties concerning the
interpretation of a contract demonstrates that the contract is
ambiguous.

Jones v. Acme Building Products, Inc., 450 P.2d

743, (Utah 1969).

In Acme the Court stated:

Ordinarily the intention of the parties
to a written contract must be determined by
an examination of the writing, but if a
phrase or a part of a written agreement is
ambiguous and the intention of the parties
cannot be determined from the writing
itself, parol evidence is admissible to show
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the intention of the contracting
parties . • . . The disagreement of the
parties interested clearly shows that the
contract involved is ambiguous and without
extrinsic evidence the true intention of the
parties cannot be determined.
Id. at 747 n.4, (quoting Milford State Bank v. West Field Canal
and Irrigation Co., 162 P.2d 101, 103 (Utah 1945)) (emphasis
added).
The question of ambiguity may also be affected by the
conduct of the parties in interpreting the Lease.

This Court

has stated that:
[E]ven if it be assumed that the words
standing alone might mean one thing to the
members of this court, where the parties
have demonstrated by their actions and
performance that to them the contract meant
something quite different, the meaning and
intent of the parties should be enforced.
In such a situation the parties by their
actions have created the 'ambiguity1
required to bring the rule into operation.
Bullough v. Sims, 400 P.2d 20, 23 (Utah 1965) (quoting
Crestview Cemetery Association v. Dieden, 356 P.2d 171, 178
(Cal. I960)) (emphasis added).
G.

The arguments of the State are inapposite.

The State cites Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah
1979), for the proposition that the royalty provision is not
defective since there is a "formula or method to set the
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price."

(Appellants* Brief, p. 20)

The Ferris case involved a

dispute over the amount of commission due the defendant on the
purchase of a home.

Under an oral agreement, the defendant was

to receive a "fair commission".

The defendant had frequently

asked the plaintiff what he considered to be a "fair
commission", but the plaintiff failed or refused to say.

The

plaintiff's refusal or failure to cooperate with the defendant
was key to the court's decision.
By contrast, the royalty provision defects in the
instant case are found in the provision itself.

Also, due to

the ambiguous nature of the royalty provision, the "formula or
method" of calculating the royalty cannot even be determined.
The District Court found that the formula is "not immediately
capable of definitive determination."

(R.654)

Moreover, Trail

Mountain did not refuse or fail to cooperate with any request
of the State to establish a reasonable interpretation of the
royalty provision.
Even assuming arguendo that the royalty provision is
not defective due to its ambiguity, the State has not
established that the proper rate under the alternate royalty
provision is 8%.

The State contends that the royalty provision

"formula" indicates an 8% royalty rate because the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act of 1976 ("FCLAA"), 30 U.S.C. § 201 et
seg., increased the federal royalty rate to 8% of the value of
coal produced on federal leases.

(Appellants' Brief, p. 21)

Although the Secretary of the Interior, pursuant to the FCLAA,
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set the royalty rate for mining underground coal at 8%, the
regulations also provide for the reduction of royalty to 5% or
lower under various circumstances.
(1986).

See 43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2

As was noted in Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel,

816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987), those regulations do not
"automatically fix" the royalty for all underground coal leases
at 8%.
II.

THE AMBIGUOUS ROYALTY PROVISION SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PARTIES PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION AS
REQUIRING THE PAYMENT OF 15^ PER TON ROYALTY.
Where the terms of a contract are ambiguous, it is

well established that courts may look to the interpretation of
the parties, as evidenced by their course of conduct, to
construe the contract.

17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 274;

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 (1979).
A.

Ambiguities in the Lease should be construed
against the State.

It is also a well established rule that if there is an
ambiguity in the language of a contract, the court will
construe the language against the drafter.

Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A. v. Midwest Realty and Finance. Inc., 544 P.2d 882 (Utah
1975).

The royalty provision of the Lease was written by the

State for its benefit.

A dispute or ambiguity concerning the

Lease language should be resolved in favor of Trail Mountain
and against the drafter, the State.
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B.

The alternate royalty provision is not
self-executing.

The Lease does not specify who has the duty of
determining which royalty rate is applicable.

Correspondence

between the State and Trail Mountain from 1976 through 1985
indicates that the parties interpreted the Lease as requiring a
15^ per ton royalty until some affirmative action was taken by
the State to change the royalty.

In other words, the parties

agreed that the change in royalty rates was not
self-executing.

See pp. 27 to 32 for a discussion of relevant

correspondence.
There is similar correspondence in the State's files
for other producing state coal leases indicating that the
royalty rate would remain at 15^ per ton until the parties
agreed to a higher prevailing federal rate, or until the
Division made a determination as to the prevailing federal rate.
Donald G. Prince, Assistant Director of the Division,
is of the opinion that affirmative action by the State was
necessary before the 15^ per ton rate would change. (R. 295,
545)
The royalty provision could not possibly be
self-executing when its meaning is not clear on its face.

The

District Court properly held that "sub-paragraph (b) is not
self-executing as to create a legal obligation on the lessee
since the identifiable factors necessary for self-execution
could not independently be ascertained by either party."
(R. 655)
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In order to be self-executing, the prevailing federal
rate would have to be an identifiable figure which could be
independently ascertained by either party.

Thus, the royalty

could only be changed upon agreement of the parties, or upon
notice and actual determination by the Division, or through
appropriate policy making or rulemaking procedures.
This position is consistent with the holding of two
Utah cases dealing with real estate contracts.

Grow v. Marwick

Development Company Inc., 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah 1980); Hansen v.
Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1976).
The State contends that the alternate royalty
provision is self-executing, and that Trail Mountain was
obliged to determine the prevailing federal rate.
Brief, p. 21)

(Appellant's

This is an extremely heavy burden to place on

the coal lessee, who may or may not be familiar with the
matters involved, or have access to the necessary information.
Given the fiduciary obligation of the State as trustee
of its lands, the responsibility to determine the proper
royalty more appropriately falls upon the State.

Officials of

the Division who were responsible for administering coal leases
were in a much better position to determine these matters.
Even these officials, however, have admitted that the royalty
provision was ambiguous and uncertain of application.
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C.

The State did not take sufficient or positive
action to establish the construction of the
ambiguous Lease provision which it now asserts.

During the nine-year period from 1976 through 1985,
the State continually represented that the 15?f royalty was
appropriate and acceptable,2
697)

(R. 417,464, 529-531, 554, 672,

See discussion pp. 27-32.

During the period from 1979

through 1985, the State accepted royalty payments at the 15?$
rate without objection.

(R. 676)

Never once did the State

indicate that a higher royalty was owing.

In fact, the State

made affirmative representations that the higher royalty would
only take effect after readjustment of the Lease in 1986.
(R. 464)
A somewhat analogous situation was presented to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Rosebud Coal
Sales Company v. Andrus, 667 F.2d 949 (1982).

In Rosebud, the

United States Department of Interior attempted to readjust a
federal coal lease approximately two and one-half years after
its readjustment date.

The court held that this action was not

authorized, and that readjustment had to be done in a timely
manner, stating in part:

2

Not only did the State for many years construe the
royalty provision differently than it now asserts, not one of the
other five producing lessees with similar royalty provisions
construed the provision according to the construction which the
State now asserts. (R. 153, 156, 372-73, 502-03, Plateau Mining
Company, et al. v. The Utah Division of State Lands, et al.
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If no action is taken by the Government for
an extended time it is reasonable to assume
that a decision was made not to take
advantage of the opportunity * * * . Thus a_
continuation of the old royalty rate and
other lease provisions can be considered a
choice then made by the administrators.
When such a choice was made we find no
provision in the Act nor in the regulations
permitting the Department to reverse the
position it took originally at the
prescribed time.
Id. at 952 (emphasis added.)
This same reasoning applies to the State's attempt to
retroactively assess Trail Mountain for additional royalties.
Assuming arguendo that under the Lease, the State had the right
to assert a higher royalty rate, it chose not to.

Perhaps it

elected not to do so because of the ambiguities in the Lease,
or perhaps because a determination was made that an increase
was not economically or otherwise justifiable.
reason is not relevant.

The exact

As in Rosebud Hit is reasonable to

assume that a decision was made not to take advantage of the
opportunity * * *.

Thus, a continuation of the old royalty

rate and other lease provisions can be considered a choice then
made by the administrators." Id,, at 952.
In fact, the Assistant Director of the Division,
Donald Prince, has stated that this is exactly what happened.
(R. 400, 540)
D.

The Lease should be construed in accordance
with the parties' past interpretation and
course of conduct.

Where the terms of a contract are ambiguous, courts
may look to the interpretation of the parties, as evidenced by
-19-

their course of conduct, to construe the contract.
2d, Contracts § 274 (1964).

17 Am. Jur.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts

§ 202 (1979).
"There is no surer way to find out what parties meant,
than to see what they have done. . . . Parties in such cases
often claim more, but rarely less, than they are entitled to."
Insurance Co. v. Dutcher, 95 U.S. 269, 273 (1877).
This rule of practical construction is applicable to
the royalty provisions of mining leases:
Where the terms of the lease are somewhat
ambiguous as to the royalties, if the lessee
pays royalties for some years on a certain
construction of the terms, it will be
regarded as the true construction, as
against him; and, if the lessor accepts
payment for some years on a particular
construction of the lease, he cannot
afterward claim royalties on a different
construction or theory . . .
58 C.J.S., Mines and Minerals § 186 (1948) (citing to numerous
cases) (emphasis added).
Practical construction is given even greater weight
when the parties' course of conduct occurred before any
controversy arose.

Fanderlik-Locke Co. v. United States,

285 F.2d 939, 947 (10th Cir. 1960), cert, denied, 365 U.S. 860
(1961).
This Court has applied the doctrine of practical
construction in a number of cases.
534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975);

Zeese v. Estate of Sieoel,

Hardinae Co., Inc. v. Eimco Corp.,
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266 P.2d 494 (Utah 1954); Minersville Reservoir & Irrigation
Co. v, Rockv Ford Irr. Co., 61 P.2d 605 (Utah 1936); Roberts v.
Tuttle, 105 P. 916 (Utah 1909); Woodward v. Edmunds, 57 P. 848
(Utah 1899).
The contract language need not be ambiguous on its
face before the doctrine of practical construction can be
applied.

Where a contract is clear on its face, but the

parties by their course of conduct have indicated that the
contract has meant something different to them, the contract is
to be interpreted according to the construction adopted by the
parties.

Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266

(Utah 1972);

EIE v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190

(Utah 1981).
The State erroneously asserts that the District Court
"rewrote" or "deleted" part (b) of the royalty provision in the
Lease.

(Appellants* Brief, p. 23)

The District Court did not

rewrite or delete the ambiguous royalty provision.

The

District Court simply and properly interpreted the provision
pursuant to an acknowledged rule of construction that courts
look to the course of conduct of the parties in construing
ambiguous contracts.
Case authority involving mineral royalty provisions
overwhelmingly supports the Judgment of the District Court.
For example, where the parties to a mining lease had previously
interpreted the lease consistent with the interpretation being
advanced by the lessor, the court adopted the lessor's
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interpretation of the lease. Allen v. Rubv Company, 389 P.2d
581 (Idaho 1964).
In Ackerman v. Sterling Paving Company, 497 P.2d 699
(Colo. App. 1972), the court held that where lessors acquiesced
in the lessee's construction of an ambiguous mineral lease for
at least three years, the lessors were bound by such
interpretation.

The court reasoned:

The evidence clearly supports the trial
court's finding:
"That the parties by their conduct
before the dispute arose, have
interpreted the Lease in accordance
with [Sterling's] construction of its
meaning and that the plaintiffs for
over three years, . . . have adopted
defendant's construction of the Lease
and acquiesced in such construction
. . . ; that plaintiffs . . . took no
sufficient or positive action to
establish their now asserted
construction of the Lease."
. . .

"We conclude that the conduct of the
parties before the controversy arose,
acting under the contract, is a
reliable test of their interpretation
of the instrument, and whatever the
stress of subsequent disagreement
neither in his own interest may be
heard to urge a different construction."
Id. at 700-701.
The same result was also reached in Wiggins v.
Engelhard Minerals and Chemicals Corporation, 328 F. Supp. 33
(M.D. Ga. 1970).
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In an action by the lessor against the lessee to
recover additional royalties allegedly due under a gas lease,
the practical construction of the parties

was adopted by the

Court in Lafitte Co. v. United Fuel Gas Company, 177 F. Supp.
52 (E.D. Ky. 1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1960). The
court reasoned:
The applicable rule is best expressed by a
quotation in the opinion in the case of Air
King Products Company v. Hazeltine Research,
D.C., 94 F. Supp. 85, 92:
1

In Carthage Tissue Paper Mills v.
Village of Carthage . . . it is said:
•Practical construction by uniform and
unquestioned acts from the outset,
especially when continued for a long
period of time, is entitled to great,
if not controlling, weight, for it
shows how the parties who made the
contract understood it. If they do not
know what they meant, who can know?
Such a construction is presumed to be
right, because it was made by the
parties themselves when under the
influence of conflicting interest.
This is true whether the construction
is by contemporaries or their
successors . . .•
Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added).
In Hall v. Landrum, 470 S.W.2d 830 (Ky. App. 1971), a
coal lease provided for royalties of 10^ per ton, with an
annual minimum royalty of $1,200.

The lessee suspended payment

of the minimum royalty, but continued to pay the 10?5 per ton
royalty for coal actually mined.

The lessor demanded

retroactive payment of the minimum annual royalty.
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Examining

the course of conduct of the parties, the court noted that the
lessor had made no complaint that the minimum royalty had not
been paid, and had accepted royalty payments on coal mined at
10?f per ton.

The court ruled that the lessee did not have to

retroactively pay the minimum royalty.
In Keefer Coal Co. v. United Electric Coal Cos.,
10 N.E.2d 210 (111. App. 1937), a dispute arose between the
parties as to the meaning of a coal royalty provision.

The

court found the royalty provision to be ambiguous and looked to
extrinsic evidence, including the parties' course of conduct,
to determine their intent.

The court noted that the ambiguous

provision was placed in the lease at the instance of the lessor
for its benefit, and was drafted by the lessor's attorney.

The

court noted that the contract should therefore be construed
more strongly against the lessor.

The court also found that

the lessor had represented to the lessee that the lease was to
be construed as the lessee advocated.
Similarly, in Prudence Coal Company v. Perkins, 217 F.
569 (4th Cir. 1914), the court found that where a lessee of
coal lands paid royalties for ten years under a certain
construction of a lease which the court found to be somewhat
ambiguous, such construction would be taken as the true
construction of the lease.
Likewise, in City of Philadelphia v. Lehigh Valley
Coal Co., 138 A. 94 (Pa. 1927), the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that a lessee who had acquiesced to a certain
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construction of the royalty provision of a coal lease for nine
years was bound by the construction adopted by the parties.
From the time the lease went into effect
until the time when the present dispute
arose, covering a period of between 9 and 10
years, . . . defendant continuously, month
after month, paid in accordance with
plaintiff's contention . . . without any
dispute as to plaintiff's alleged right. So
far as this record shows, neither orally nor
by writing did defendant, between June 21,
1916, and the time when the present
controversy arose, ever challenge the
accuracy of plaintiff's calculations, made
in accordance with the agreement set forth
in the letter of that date, nor, indeed, did
defendant ever assert that this agreement
was anything less than an amendment or
interpretation of the lease itself. For
these reasons, the uniform construction by
the parties must prevail, and defendant
cannot now effectively set up its attempted
defense.
Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
In McKeever v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 68 A. 670 (Pa.
1908), the royalty provision of the coal lease was susceptible
of two different constructions.

The court reasoned as follows:

The agreement was not carefully drawn so as
to fix with absolute certainty the exact
meaning of the parties on the question of
the payment of the royalties. It is
susceptible of two different meanings; and,
if the case stood on the agreement alone, we
would have some hesitation in reaching a
conclusion. Whatever doubt has arisen in
our minds in the consideration of the
question involved is resolved in favor of
the appellee, because of the acts of the
original lessor, who for a long period of
years accepted payment of the royalties from
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the lessees on the basis of $300 per acre,
as determined by actual survey and receipted
in full for all royalties to the date when
paid. . . .
The conclusion is irresistible that the
original lessor interpreted his own contract
to mean a sale or leasing, of his coal at an
amount equivalent to $300 per acre, and for
a long period of years accepted payment in
full on this basis. We think the parties
have construed their own contract, and
courts will not disturb the rights and
liabilities arising under the same when
these things have been definitely determined
by the contracting parties themselves.
Id. (emphasis added).

See also, Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Searle

and Stark Heirs. 94 A. 74 (Pa. 1915).
In accord is Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Shonk Land Co.,
228 S.E.2d 139 (W.Va. 1982), in which the lessor, after ten
years of accepting royalty payments under the lessee's
interpretation of the coal lease, brought an action to recover
alleged deficiencies, arguing that the lessee had incorrectly
interpreted the lease.
construction,

The court upheld the lessee's

id. at 146.

In Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Ingram, 560 F.2d 994,
988 (10th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 436 U.S. 958 (1978), the
parties' construction of an oil and gas lease royalty provision
for 30 years was upheld where both parties had knowledge of the
construction.
A party who received royalty payments under an oil and
gas lease for almost eight years was held bound to the parties'
course of conduct in interpreting the royalty provision, in
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Kretni Development Co. v. Consolidated Oil Corp., 74 F.2d 497
(10th Cir. 1934), cert, denied, 295 U.S. 750 (1935).

See also

Lackey v. Ohio Oil Co., 138 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1943), and
London Extension Mining Co. v. Ellis, 134 F.2d 405 (10th Cir.
1943)
E.

The parties have consistently interpreted the
royalty provision as only requiring the payment
of a 15<zf per ton royalty.

Beginning in October, 1976, and continuing until
October, 1985, the Division has repeatedly taken the position
that the proper royalty under the Lease was 15<zJ per ton, and
that the royalty would remain 15^ per ton until the Lease was
readjusted.
(1)

This is demonstrated by the following documents.
Letter of October 4, 1976, from C. J. Brinton,

Economic Geographer for the Division, to John L. Bell.
(R. 394-395)

Mr. Brinton states that the 15^ rate "will be the

rate until one of two situations which could alter this rate
occur."

First, the royalty can be changed "at such time as the

Federal lease in question begins production."

Second, the

royalty can change upon readjustment "at the end of each 20
year period of the lease term."

(R. 395)

The royalty rate of

15<zf per ton was not changed when any Federal lease began
production.

Thus, the 15<zf royalty rate was to remain in effect

until readjustment of the lease terms.
(2) Letter dated September 4, 1980 from John T.
Blake, Mineral Resources Specialist for the Division, to
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Mr. Myron F. Fetterolf.

(R. 406)

This letter advised

Mr. Fetterolf that the Trail Mountain Mine was in violation of
the terms of the Lease due to certain activities at the mine.
If there was a violation of the Lease due to underpayment of
royalties, presumably this would also have been asserted by the
Division.

The absence of such an assertion clearly indicates

that the 15?f per ton royalty rate was acceptable to the
Division as of 1980.
(3)

Letter dated January 29, 1981, from John T.

Blake, Mineral Resources Specialist for the Division, to the
Fetterolf Group (Trail Mountain's predecessor).

(R. 412)

This

letter increases the minimum annual royalty under the Lease to
$1.50 per acre.

There is no mention of a possible increase in

the 15?f per ton production royalty, despite the fact that there
had been production under the Lease for 1-1/2 years.

If the

Division believed that the production royalty was tied to the
federal 8% royalty, (which had then been in effect for
5, years), this was an appropriate time to raise the issue.
Since the Division declined to do so, there is a strong
presumption that the 15gf per ton royalty was acceptable to the
Division.
(4) Approval of Lease Assignment dated February 17,
1981.

(R. 670, 411)

The Division approved the assignment of

the Lease to Trail Mountain without any notice of a deficiency
in royalty payments.
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(5) Letter dated May 8, 1981, from John T. Blake,
Mineral Resources Specialist for the Division, to Natomas
Energy Company (Trail Mountain's Predecessor).
Mr. Blake states:

(R. 671, 414)

"Thank you for submitting royalty payments

for the first quarter for the Trail Mountain Mine.

The State

Land Board does have a form to be used in reporting production
and royalty which we ask that you use in the future."

At this

time, royalties had been paid at the rate of 15^ per ton for
the preceding two years.

This letter clearly indicates that

the 15$f rate was still acceptable to the Division, and was
appropriate under the Lease.
(6) Telephone conversation in September, 1983 between
John T. Blake, Mineral Resources Specialist for the Division,
and Bruce K. Anderson, Accounting Manager For Trail Mountain.
(R. 672, 417)

In this conversation Mr. Blake represented that

the royalty under the Lease was 15^ per ton.

This was in

response to Mr. Anderson's attempt to confirm the royalty rate
since he was then taking over responsibility for making royalty
payments to the Division.
(7)

(R. 553)

Letter dated May 9, 1984 from John T. Blake,

Mineral Resources Specialist for the Division to Trail Mountain
Coal Company.

(R. 673, 462)

By this letter, the Division sent

a new royalty reporting form to Trail Mountain.

Certainly, if

there was any deficiency in royalties, the Division would have
also notified Trail Mountain at this time.
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(8) Several telephone conversations between 1983 and
1985 between Ervine Allen, Jr., Senior Land Management
Administrator for Trail Mountain, and (1) John T. Blake,
Mineral Resources Specialist with the Division, and
(2) Ralph A. Miles, Director of the Division.

In each case,

these officials confirmed that the correct royalty rate was
being paid.
(9)

(R. 303-304, 526-531)
Interoffice Correspondence dated July 16, 1984,

from E. Allen, Jr. to R. Ec Garbesi, B. B. Mullins, and J. W.
Damato of Diamond Shamrock Coal Company.

(R. 465)

This

internal memorandum notes that the State of Utah had advised
the Company that the terms of the Lease would be readjusted,
and "The production royalty rate, currently 15^5 per ton, will
be increased to 8% of the fair market value."

At this point in

time, based on communications from the State, the Company was
still under the impression that the proper royalty rate was 15^z5
per ton.
(10) Letter dated August 24, 1984, from John T. Blake,
Mineral Resources Specialist for the Division, to Trail
Mountain Coal Company.

(R. 697, 464)

Mr. Blake states in part

that "The intended twenty year readjustment will likely raise
* * * production royalty to 8% of gross value."

(R. 464)

This

clearly indicates that (1) production royalty had not then been
raised to 8% of gross value, and (2) the State did not expect
Trail Mountain to pay royalties at the 8% rate.

This occurred

8 years after the royalty rate on new federal leases had been
raised to 8% of value.
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(11) Notes of a conversation on March 7, 1985, between
John T. Blake of the Division and Joe Fielder, General Manager
of Trail Mountain, concerning the twenty-year readjustment.
(R. 697, 554)

These notes indicate that Mr. Blake told Mr.

Fielder that the 8% royalty would come into effect on
January 1, 1986, the effective date of the readjustment.

This

confirmed both parties1 understanding that the royalty rate had
not previously increased to the federal 8% rate; but that it
remained at 15<zf per ton until the readjustment was effective.
See (R. 560)

Raising the royalty at the 20 year readjustment

period is similar to the procedure followed with federal coal
leases.

Under federal law, the terms of each federal coal

lease may be revised or "readjusted" periodically at the
discretion of the federal government.

Generally this occurs

20 years after the lease is issued, and each 10 years
thereafter.

(R. 686)

(12) Twenty two Production and Settlement Transmittal
Forms sent by Trail Mountain and its predecessors to the
Division during the period from 1979 through 1985, showing that
royalties were computed at the rate of 15^ per ton.
418-461)

(R. 698,

Note that each of these forms contained two columns

for computations of royalties.

One column was based on a cents

per ton rate, while the other column was based upon a
percentage rate.

In every case, on all 22 forms, the royalty

was computed using the cents per ton column at the rate of 15?f
per ton.

In every case the percentage column was left blank.
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The Division has stipulated to the fact that these forms were
routinely reviewed as they were received to assure that they
were accurate,

(R. 677)

The Division's acceptance of the

forms without questioning the royalty calculation, was a clear
indication that the 15^ per ton rate had been agreed upon as
the proper rate.
(13) Twenty two royalty payment checks received and
cashed by the Division during the period from 1979 through
1985.

(R. 676, 418-461)

In each case the Division sent a

receipt to Trail Mountain or its predecessors.

In no case did

the Division indicate that there was any question regarding the
amount of each check.

This clearly indicates that the Division

had agreed to accept 15^ per ton as the royalty on coal
produced from the Lease.
The foregoing discussion of the parties* practical
construction of the royalty provision of the Lease upholds the
District Court's Judgment, and is dispositive of the State's
Appeal.
III. THE STATE IS ESTOPPED FROM RETROACTIVELY ASSESSING
ROYALTY OTHER THAN AT 15^ PER TON.
Trail Mountain does not believe it is necessary for
the Court to determine the estoppel issue.

If, however, the

Court finds that the parties' practical construction is not
dispositive of the State's Appeal, then Trail Mountain alleges
that the State should be estopped from now asserting a
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different interpretation of the Lease and from retroactively
assessing royalty at a rate other than 15^ per ton.
In the interest of judicial economy and pursuant to
Rule 24(i) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Trail
Mountain adopts by reference pp. 27-53 of the Brief of
Respondent Plateau Mining Company, regarding the issue of
estoppel.

Trail Mountain, however, wishes to briefly

supplement the adopted argument with the following points.
Contrary to the contention of the State, the officers
of the Division who dealt with Trail Mountain acted within the
scope of their authority.

In fact, these individuals were

specifically designated by the Division to deal with the
matters involved.

At no time did any of the state officials

deny that they had the authority to accept royalties at the
15^ per ton rate. At no time did the state officials indicate
that the matter had to be decided by higher authority.
Clearly, if these officials did not have actual authority to
make the representations they did, they at least had apparent
authority to do so.
The State, after supporting the authority of its
officers to make decisions on royalties payable over a ten year
period, should now be estopped from denying its officer's
authority merely because it is in the State's present interest
to do so.

See City of Haileyville v. Smallwood, 441 P.2d 389

(Okla. 1968); Johnson v. Angle, 341 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Neb.
1971).
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Even assuming arguendo that the representations of the
Division's officers were unauthorized, the State should still
be estopped in order to prevent manifest injustice.

Celebrity

Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979);
Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982)
(citing United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F 2d 985 (9th Cir.
1973) and United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir.
1975)) .
Moreover, courts are disposed to apply the doctrine of
estoppel against a state where the acts or representations are
merely ultra vires, as opposed to acts or representations which
are prohibited by statute or are malum in se.

Utah State

University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1982).
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE LAW
REGARDING SCHOOL TRUST LANDS IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT.
In essence, the State asserts (1) that it had a

constitutional and moral duty to obtain "full value" from the
disposition of school trust lands; (2) that the District Court
"placed impermissible restrictions" on the trust lands; and (3)
that this Court now has the duty to provide the State with full
value by enforcing the alternate royalty provision.
(Appellants' Brief p. 10)
A.

The status of the State as trustee does not alter
the law of contracts.

The State carries the trust argument too far.

The

District Court did not restrict the use of the school trust
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fund in any way; nor did the Court place any restriction on the
State in contravention of the State Constitution or statutes.
All the Court did was construe a contract.

The fact that the

State was one of the parties to the contract, does not alter
the law of contracts.

The fact that the State was acting as a

trustee for the benefit of the school fund, does not alter the
law of contracts.
The cases from other jurisdictions cited by the State
are inapposite.

Some of these cases held that the State, as

trustee, violated its own laws or Constitution (which are
different from Utah's laws and Constitution).

Lassen v.

Arizona, 385 U.S. 458, 87 S. Ct. 584, 17 L. Ed. 2d 515 (1967)
held that Arizona must compensate the trust for the full value
of trust lands it condemned.

Utah's Enabling Act and

Constitution do not contain the language relied upon by the
Arizona court.

Kadish v. Arizona State Land Department, 747

P.2d 1183, 1195 (Ariz. 1987), held that a disposal of school
trust lands for less than their appraised value was a violation
of dispositional restrictions of the Enabling Act.

Utah's

Enabling Act and Constitution impose no such restrictions.
Oklahoma Education Association v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla.
1981), held that school trust assets may not be used to
subsidize farming and ranching operations, and that
low-interest loans of trust funds to farmers or low-rental
leases of trust lands to farmers were unconstitutional.
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Other cases cited by the State held that the State
breached its fiduciary duty, which is not alleged in this
case.

County of Skamania v. Washington, 685 P.2d 576 (Wash.

1984) held that a trustee breached its fiduciary duty by
disposing of a trust asset without obtaining "the best possible
price" for the asset.

The trustee could not use trust assets

to pursue other state goals•

State v University of Alaska, 624

P.2d 807 (Alaska 1981), held that inclusion of university lands
in a state park without compensation was a breach of trust, and
the university was entitled to compensation.
Other cases cited by the State merely held that the
State was not bound by clerical errors.

State v. Lamacus, 263

P.2d 426 (Okla. 1953), affirmed the holding in State v.
Phillips Petroleum Company that a clerical error in a
certificate of purchase did not allow the purchaser to receive
a mineral interest.
Three cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant.
State of Utah v. Kleppe, 586 F.2d 756, 758 (10th Cir. 1978),
only held that the State of Utah was entitled to select "in
lieu" lands for school land grants that were denied Utah
because of "federal pre-emption, private entry prior to survey,
or before title could pass to the state", without regard to
whether the lands were equal in value or met other
administrative criteria.

Alamo Land and Cattle Company v.

Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 96 S. Ct. 910, 47 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976),
held only that a lessee of school trust lands must be
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compensated when the federal government condemns

the land.

Department of State Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948 (Mont,
1985) held that absent adequate consideration, the state had no
power to grant lessees of trust lands permission to develop
appurtenant water rights.

None of these cases goes as far as

the State attempts to go in this case.
The State asserts that the District Court "amended"
the Lease, and then "created" a new contract.

Since the new

contract supposedly limits royalties to 15^5 per ton, and
supposedly deletes the alternate royalty provision, the
contract "created by the trial court" supposedly violates the
requirement that the State receive full value for its lands,
and is therefore "void."

(Appellant's brief at p. 18-19).

This is creative, but it does not stand up to scrutiny.
The District Court recognized in its Memorandum
Decision that the alternate royalty provision was still part of
the Lease.
Lease.

The Court did not amend the Lease or create a new

It simply applied principles of contract law to the

provision; found it to be ambiguous as a matter of law; and
applied a legal principle of contract construction.
(R. 654-655)

Other principles of law may or may not have also

been applicable, but the court held, as a matter of law based
upon extensive stipulated facts, that the parties construed the
ambiguous provision in a particular way.
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B.

The status of the State as trustee does not alter
the State's interpretation of the royalty provision
over a course of years.

Any loss of trust revenues to the State was not caused
by the District Court but by the State's original failure to
draft a usable royalty provision, and the State's own
interpretation of its royalty language over a course of years.
The major problem with the State's position is the
assertion that the Utah courts now have the obligation to
enforce the alternate royalty provision, even in the face of
the State's own failure to do so.

In other words, since the

State's officers interpreted and enforced the royalty provision
over a ten year period in a manner which the State now wishes
to repudiate, the State attempts to shift the burden of
enforcement to the courts by arguing that there is a
constitutional duty to do so.
The State's duties with respect to school trust lands
stem from the Utah Enabling Act and the Utah Constitution.
Section 10 of the Utah Enabling Act provides:
That the proceeds of lands herein granted
for educational purposes . . . shall
constitute a permanent school fund, the
interest of which only shall be expended for
the support of said schools . . .
Thus, the Enabling Act simply requires the use of proceeds from
school trust lands to support the schools.
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The Utah Constitution, Art- XX, § 1, provides:
All lands of the State that have been or may
hereafter be granted to the State by
Congress . . . are hereby accepted, and
declared to be public lands of the State;
and shall be held in trust for the people,
to be disposed of as may be provided by law,
for the respective purposes for which they
have been or may be granted, donated,
devised or otherwise acquired.
Thus, the Utah Constitution simply imposes an obligation to
hold the lands "in trust for the people."
This case is not one in which the proceeds of school
trust lands are alleged to have been used for purposes other
than support of the schools; nor is it a case in which the
trust status of the lands is being questioned.

Therefore, the

above provisions are not dispositive of any issue in this case.
Further, the State did receive full value when it
imposed the alternate royalty provision as part of the Lease
terms.

The Lease was entered into at arm's length, presumably

after negotiation of acceptable value for each party.

The fact

that the language used by the State was less than artful, and
that the parties construed it over the years in a particular
manner, does not mean that less than full value was received by
the State.
Thus, there is nothing "unconstitutional" about the
royalty provision or the manner in which it was construed by
the parties or the District Court.
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C.

As trustee, the State is required to administer the
trust estate under the rules of law applicable to
trustees in general.

The State is required to administer school trust lands
subject to the law and rules applicable to the handling of
trust estates.

State Board of Educational Lands and Funds v.

Jarchow, 362 N.W.2d 19 (Neb. 1985).
When managing and administering school trust lands,
the state must comport with the same fiduciary obligations as
are applied to a private trustee.

County of Skamania v. State,

685 P.2d 576 (Wash. 1984).
The State has "considerable discretionary power when
dealing with the disposition of an interest in land they hold
in trust for the people . . . ."
808, 811 (Mont. 1966).

State v. Babcock, 409 P.2d

The State must necessarily have that

discretionary power because not every facet of the State's
administration of the trust can be set out in the statutes or
constitution.

Id.

See also United States v. Fenton, 27

F. Supp. 816 (D.C. Id. 1939).
Courts "may interfere with the trustees* administration
of a trust only when it finds an abuse of the trustees*
discretion or a violation of law.**

In re Estate of Bishop, 499

P.2d 670, 673 (Haw. 1972); see also Miller v. First Hawaiian
Bank, 604 P.2d 39 (Haw. 1979); In re Trust Estate of Wills, 448
P.2d 435 (Ariz. App. 1968); Humane Society of Carson City v.
First Nat'l Bank, 553 P.2d 963 (Nev. 1976).
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"The reasonable assumption is that discretion vested
in a trustee should be exercised honestly, fairly and
reasonably to accomplish the stated purpose of the trust, and
not in an arbitrary and negative manner to defeat it."

In re

Estate of Wallich, 420 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah 1966).
The State raises no inference that it has acted in
anything other than good faith in fulfilling its obligations as
trustee of the school lands. Trail Mountain has not alleged or
implied anything to the contrary.

In the absence of

allegations of abuse of discretion, the presumption must be
that the State fulfilled its obligation as trustee when it
received and accepted royalty of 15«£ per ton.
Even assuming arguendo that the State exceeded its
authority as trustee when it represented that the royalty was
15^ per ton and when it accepted the same without protest; a
third party without actual knowledge that the trustee was
exceeding its powers or improperly exercising them, is fully
protected in dealing with the trustee the same as if the
trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers it
purported to exercise.
By statute, Utah protects third persons in dealing
with trustees.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-406 provides as follows:

With respect to a third person dealing with
a trustee or assisting a trustee in the
conduct of a transaction, the existence of
trust power and their proper exercise by the
trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The
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third person is not bound to inquire whether
the trustee has power to act or is properly
exercising the power; and a third person,
without actual knowledge that the trustee is
exceeding his powers or improperly
exercising them, is fully protected in
dealing with the trustee as if the trustee
possessed and properly exercised the powers
he purports to exercise . . . .
There have been no allegations that the State has
exceeded its authority as trustee.

In the absence of such

assertions, the presumption must be that the State was within
its authority in interpreting the royalty provision as
requiring payment of royalty at the rate of 15^ per ton.
The State, citing authority from other jurisdictions,
asserts that a party leasing school trust lands is charged with
knowledge of the trust.

(Appellants1 Brief, p. 17)

Taking the

State's assertion as true, Trail Mountain's knowledge of the
trust has no impact on the District Court's Judgment.

Pursuant

to statute, Trail Mountain need not have inquired whether the
State was properly exercising its authority.

Trail Mountain is

"fully protected" in its dealings with the trustee.
Finally, even if the Court were to find merit in the
State's contentions regarding trust land law and policy, a
higher royalty rate should not be assessed against Trail
Mountain retroactively.

The law should not be applied to work

a hardship on either a public official or a citizen where both
have exercised good faith under the law.

Oklahoma Education

Association, Inc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1982).

-42-

V.

AN "ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS" STANDARD OF REVIEW IS
NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE,
The State contends that the issues before this Court

were decided against Trail Mountain by the Director of State
Lands, and that the Court cannot override the Director's
decision unless it is "arbitrary or erroneous."

(Appellants1

Brief, p. 9)
The District Court has de novo review of an informal
adjudicative proceeding.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15.

In this

case, the District Court was reviewing a decision of the
director at an informal hearing held on July 29, 1986. This
was a hearing before the same State official whose decision was
being appealed.

(R. 683-684)

The State never raised the issue

of jurisdiction, and did not take any action to have this
matter heard before this Court rather than the District Court.
The Director's decision is therefore not entitled to
deference from this Court.
of law.

This is especially true of issues

Adkins v. Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524, 526

(Utah 1986).

The State concedes that the controlling issues in

this case are issues of law.
VI.

(Appellants' Brief, p. 10)

THE STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST.
The District Court, in its Order granting Summary

Judgment, made certain rulings regarding interest as claimed by
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the State in its audit report.

The Judge held:

(1) Interest

would not begin to accrue except on delinquent payments and
then only after demand was made; and (2) interest would accrue
only at the legal rate as provided by statute and not at the
rate fixed retroactively by board regulation.

The State in

this appeal has not cited error as to these rulings.

Inasmuch

as Appellants are not responding to those matters, it is
assumed that the Judge's decision is and will be the
established law of the case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the
District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of October, 1988.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

B y ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ _
Calvin L. Rampton
Richard Be Johns
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent
Trail Mountain Coal Company
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APPENDIX A

KSJJ;
MINERAL LEASE APPLICATION

MINERAL LEASE NO.
GRANT:

NO.

School

?2603

Utah State Lease for

COAL
THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE A N D AGREEMENT entereJ into in duplicate this JLkI»._ day ol
T.^II^iH
by and herween the STATE LAND BOARD, acting in behalf of the State of Utah, heietnafter called the Lessor, and
• liALCOL-: K.

. 19..JL,

KclURIu;*

1772 South Mrin S t r e e t
Pa It Like C«ty, Utah £/i)0i

party of the second part, hereinafter called the Lessee, under and Turtuam to Title 65, Utah Code Annotated. 1953.
WITNESSETH: That the Lessor, in consideration of the rents and royalties to be paid and the covenants to be ohserve4 by the Lessee, as here*
inafier act forth, does hereby grant and lease to the leasee the exclusive nqhr and privilege to mine, remote, ertd dispne of all of the
»aid minerals in, upon, or under the following described tract of land situated in

A l l of &crtIo:i Ti.i -t:;-a::: (3 >, Tnr«.o;r
Si::

(

) U r . s * , K:..

L/C

1% CT*

Count-,, State of Utah, towit:

S-ve: '.utr 0 7 ) S o t : ! . , ilr- ; r

;.V I-'ir.'.,

containim: a total of
^**-»Uv#
acre-, more or les<, rocether wuh the richt to use and occupy so much of the turfare of tatd land as
may be required for all purrees resw.ablv incident to the mininc. removal, anr! dupocil cf said mineraK according to the ptuvistom o' rhts
lea*e, for the ren *d endmt: ttn year* after the first day cf January next suaceJing the date hereof and as lent; there?{'cr a? 'aid minerals ma>
be rreduced in commercial quantities from vatd lands or Levee «>h:il! continue to mske the pavrnems teemed by Article It! hereof, upon
condition that at ihe end of each rwenty (10) >ear period succeeding the first day cf the tear in which this lca<* is i».*ted, such readjustment
of terms and eondmom may be made as the le**»r mav determine to be r>eces<arv in the interest of the St.»rr.
ARTICLE I
This lease is granted subrect in all resrects to am! under the conditions of the laws of t**e State of Utah and existing rule* and regulations
and such operating rules and regulations at ma> be hereafter approved and ndoped by th- State Land Board.
ARTICLE «
TIti« tease cr\ers only the mining, removal, and disposal cf the minerals specified in this lease, bur the Lessee shall promptly nenfy the
the Lessor of the discovery of any minerals extepmg those enumerated herein.
ARTICLE 111
The Leasee, in consideration of the grantm*: of the tight* and privileges aforesaid, hereby covenants mnd afree* as follows:
FIRST: To pay to the Lessor as rental for the land coveted by this lease the vum of fifty (SO) cents per acre per annum. All «uch annual
pavmenrs of rrntal shall be made in advance <*n the 2nd day of January of each year, except the
I 91* J
on the execution of this lease. All rentals shall be credited againat royalties for the tear in which they accrue.

rental which if pat able

SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter, royalty
(a 1 at the rate of 13/ per ton of 2000 II*. of OMI produced from the Irased ptemiats and uAd or otherwise disposed of, or
CM at the_rate prevailing, at the beginnmr? of the qiurter fur which payment is being made, foe federal lestees of land of similar-character under coallcases issued by the United States at that time,
• . ___
whichever i» higher, and, commencing with the year brnnnitm the January I following two years from the dztt hereof, to raf annual royalty
of at least S1.CC multiplied bv the number of acres brtebv leased regardless of actual production, provided that Lessor may, at any time after
the tenth anniversary date hereof, increase the minimum annual royalty by not to exceed 50%.

Tf the coal produced from the leased premises la wtslted before sate or other disposition b? Lessee, Lessee tna? pay royalty on the washed
product only, provided Levee maintains accurate record by which the weight of washed coal originating from the leased preru.es can be
ascertained and complies with all regulations and directives issued by Lessor to prevent waste and to insure that royalty is paid on sit washed
coal originating from the leafed premises.
THIRD: To prepare arvl forward to the State Land Office, on or before the 15th day of the month next succeeding the quarter in which
the material is produced, a citified statement of the amount of production of all of the leased substances disposed of from said lands, and
such other additional information as the State Land Board may from rime to time require.
FOURTH: To keep at the mine office clear, accurate and detailed mans on tracing cloth, en • scale not more than 50 feet to the inch,
of the working* in fiili section of the leased land* and on fhe lands adjacent, «.aid maps to be coordinated with reference to a public land cor*
ner so that they can be readily and correctly superimposed, and to furnish to the Lessor annually, or upon demand, certified copies of such
maps and such written statements of operations as may be called for. All surveys shall be made by a licensed engineer snd sll maps certified
to by him.
FIFTH: Kot to fence or otherwise male inareessihe to stock any watering place on the premises without firsr obtaining the written consent
of I.essor, nor to permit or contribute to the pollution of any surface or subsurface water available or capable of being made available for domestic
or irrigation u«e.
SIXTH: K.u to assign this lease or any interest therein, nor sublet any portion of the leased premise*, or any of the rights and privileges
herein granted, arithout the written consent of the Lessor being first haJ and obtained.
ARTICLE l\'
The Lessor hetebr excerr* and reserves from the operation of this lesse:
FIRST: The richt to rerrr.it for ioint or several use such easements or rights-of-way upon, through, or in the land hereby leased as may
be neces«a*v or appropriate t.> the working cf these or other lands belonging to or administered by the Lessor containing mineral deposits
or for other use.
SF.CONP: The rir'*t t--» ««•. le-se, sell, or otherwise di:.pc«e of the surface of said lands or any part thereof, under existing State laws
or laws hereafter en*.' I, in* ^f.-.r rs *a».l surface is not necessary for the l.esee in the mining, remov.il, or disposal of the leased substances therein, an J to lea** mineral depovr-, c**hcr th-»n those lea-ed herd v. which may be contained in said lands to Ion* as the recovery of such deposits does not unreasonably ;ntrrfere with Lessee's ripht* herein granted.
ARTICLE V
I 'p>*n frrJw- or irfn ii of the I.e re to at rrp? the readii'-imrnr of term* an I condition* demanded by the I.es'or at the end of an? twentyyear peri.**!, «uji f. ilnre »•» ref:-s:d shall work a forfeiture of the lease and the same shall be canceled.
ARTICLE VI
In ca^e of txpiraMon. forfeiture, surrender or other trrrrfitirn of tht* lea«e, all uni!ergr»»und timbering supports, shaft lininrr. rail* and
other jntr.ll.in n- ne:e« •.•:;• I T the v.ipr^rt of m. Ica-rMuvl work inns of any mine-, ami all rails or head frames anJ all installations which
cannot be rcmrvr.! v.itiiou: t-e-n..-»tirnt in«ury to the pT?mt>?* and all conMnt-tiVn and equipment installed underground ?o provi.le vemil.ition
for anv nvt-.c . up «n or in rr.-. «:j.l land* sh.tll he and remain a part of the realrv ami shall revert to the Le?*or without further eomideration ot
CPtnrJii-.vi.o .•»:*.J «hrll be left by fh- I.- <?e in the lands.
All rer«.«-tvl pr •; cm- of I.*"««ee located within or upon the said land-, an I all huld.no, machinery, equipment and tools (other than fhe
in• tallati.m* to Sr;":p»* the pr. perrv of l.e .«• »r a ;iK»ve proviiled), shall \y ar.d rt main the property of Lessee and Ler<ee shall h? emitl«rJ to,
and mav, w:th:n six (• » in^rth* .v'ter mch expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other termination of said leare, or within *uch extension of
time as mav he gratm-d bv I c»or, remove from the «oid lands su. h rcr5« nal property and improvements, other than ttV»se items which are
to remain the prop-rtv :f tiir I.e « — as ah>vc provided.
Le*»ee sh ;!, upon termm-r-n. of thi* Ie:*e or armdonmem of tf:- leaded premise for any reason, seal to Lr*«or's satisfaction all or such
pan of the mine oper.if.jrs ,n th- prtnire*: as I.e*'.or shall request be sealed.
ART)CLE VII
It shal! U th* re* r* •nihility of the Le*>ee to slope the siJr* of all operations of a surface nature to an anple of not les* than 45* or to
erect a barrier arom-d *r. h operation a' the State Land Roar.! may require. Such slopinr? or fencing shall become a normal part of the operation of the lease v* »* t.» \r?r t .ife uith such operation to the extent that such operation shall not constitute a hazard.
ARTICLE Vlff
Lessee «ha!l not «e!l cr otherwt*e d:«r**e of anv wer riphts acquired for use upon the leased premises except with Lessor's written rtrmi««ion. \J\\*n termination of this lease for any rea«on. all such rights acquired by application to the Utah State Engineer shall revert to the
Lessor as an appirtenance fo the lea«ed premises, and all such rir.hfs acquired by other means shall be offered to Lessor in writing for purchase
at Le«*ee's acquisi'inn com, ptwidtd that Lessor shall be deemed to have rejected such offer if it does not accept the same within thirty
days after receipt thereof.
ARTICLE IX
All of the terms, covenants, conditions, snd obligations in this lesse contained, shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators,
and assigns of the Lessee.
ARTICLE X
Lessee may terminate this lease at any time upon giving three (3) months' notice in writing to the Lessor »nd upon payment of all
rents and royalties and other sums due and payable tc the Lessor, and upon complying with the terms of this lease with respect to the preservation of the wnrkmrt in such order and condition as to permit of the continued operation of the leased premises.
ARTICLE XI
Lessor, its n{ftce*<. and acenu, shall have the tight at ail times to go in and upon the leased lands and premises, during the term of said
lease to inspect th* worl: done ami the pt^Krers thereof on said lands and the ptoducts obtained therefrom, and to post any notices on the
said land that it may iletm fit and proper; and also shall permit any authorized representatives of the Lessor to examine all books and records
pertaining to operations under this lea«-e, »ru.l to male copies of and extracts from the same, if desired.
ARTICLE Xtt
This lease is issued only under such title as the State of Utah may now hold, and that In the event the State Is hereafter divested of such
title, fhe Lessor shall not be liable for any damages sustained by fhe Lessee, nor shall the Lessee be entited to or claim any refund of rentals
or royalties or other monies theretofcre paid to the Lessor.

STATE OF UTAH
STATE LAND BOARD

£<<r--teSfrk&'-'

:'^«AJ
/

DKECTOfl

- ^ ,
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ ^ J ^ ^ ? * ^ LESSEE

STATE OF UTAH

1
} ss.
I

COUNTY OF

LESSEE'S INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

%
On the

J»v of

19

, personally appeared beforr me

the sicner of rhe above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
Given under my hanJ and seal this

..

—

day of

~

My ecmmt*-'t*n Expires:

..
executed the same.

-... 19........

Kotary Public, rerirfmj; at:

STATE OF UTAH

On the

LESSEE'S CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

)

COUNTY OF
-

day of

19

, personally uproar?J More me

who brin? duly sworn did siy that he is an officer of

-

_

,
—

-... anJ that sad instrument was signeJ

in behalf of said corporation by resolution of its Beard of Directors, and said

«

acknowl-

edged to me that said corporation executed the same.

Given under my hand and seal this

day of

—

My commission Expires:

1 9 _

Notary Public, residing at:

STATE OF UTAH

1

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

J "*"

On the ..JM
.. dav of .. ./-'. *J^...A
19..'....:., personally apprarrd brforr inr Max C. Gardner, who bring by me duly sworn
did MV that he it the Dirrctor of thr Statr Land Board of the Statr of Utah and that said instrument was signed in brhaif of laid Board by
resolution of the Board, and uid Ma* C. Gardner at knowlrdftrd to me that said Board executed the same in behalf of the Sute of Utah.

Given under my hand and teal thia

My eommiaaioo Expires:

*

day of ,., *~j/.J./.*'i \ V/f,

19^.^1

Notary Public, nrsidinf or:

\ y

Hi

APPENDIX B

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH MILES,
DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY, THE
UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY, THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,

Civil No. 4847

Defendants.
The plaintiff has moved the Court for partial summary
judgment and has supported the same by the stipulated facts as
set forth in the agreed Pre-trial Order and other supporting
affidavits, and has submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points
and Authorities.

The defendants have objected to the Motion and

have filed their own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
have submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points and Authorities.
The defendants have objected to the publication of
certain depositions requested by the plaintiff and referred to
by the plaintiff in their Memorandum.

The Court finds that the

Motion is well taken and will not order publication of the
depositions at this time, and will not consider any of the
matters referred to in the deposition in the disposition of
these motions.

The Court finds that there is no dispute as to the
material facts in this case and has concluded therefrom that
the plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment as prayed
for and grants the plaintiff's motion.
The Court has further concluded that the defendants
are not entitled to partial summary judgment and denies their
motion.
The factual situation is nearly identical to the fact
situation as shown in Carbon County Case No. 14890, Plateau
Mining Company v. The Division of State Lands and Forestry,
et al. , and the Court has attached hereto a copy of its opinion
in that case to show the reasoning of the Court, and the legal
analysis used by the Court, in reaching its decision in this
case. .
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to prepare
a formal judgment in accordance with this decision.
DATED this

/ / ^

day of April, 1988.

2

CERTIFICATE OF

MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct
copies of the foregoing

MEMORANDUM

DECISION

by depositing

the sane in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the
followina:

Clark 3. Allred
Gayle F. McKeachnie
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Special Assistant Attorney General
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah
84078
David L. Wilkinson
UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
David S. Christensen
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
Calvin L. Ranpton
Richard 3. Johns
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
Attorneys at Law
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101

DATED this

day of April, 1988

Secretary

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

)
PLATEAU MINING COMPANY, a
Delaware Corporation, and
1
)
CYPRUS WESTERN COAL EQUIPMENT
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs .
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY; THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY; THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES; DEE HANSEN,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,
Defendants.

i
]
)
)
)
',
)
)

Civil No. 14890

)

The plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment from
the Court declaring that the royalty provision contained in the
State Lease of the defendants is ambiguous and that it should
be construed

in light of the parties course of performance;

that the lease is not self-executing so
obligation on plaintiffs to pay a higher

as to place a legal
rate of royalty after

the State accepted without qualification the payment of the
stated rate of $.15 per ton of coal produced; that the
defendants may not retroactively apply their new policy
imposing a royalty rate of 8%; that the defendants are estopped

from demanding payment of royalties on coal mined during the
audit period at a rate higher than that paid by plaintiffs and
accepted by defendants; that the defendants have waived their
right to demand a higher royalty rate than the one accepted
during the audit period; and that the ruling of the State
relative to imposing interest and penalties cannot be legally
enforced.
The defendants have objected to the granting of the
Motion and have submitted their own Motion for Summary Judgment
asking the Court to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state
a cause of action; ordering the plaintiff, Plateau Mining
Company, to pay the delinquent royalty payment as determined on
the basis of 8% of gross sales value during the audit period;
ordering that the plaintiff, Plateau Mining Company, owes
interest on delinquent royalty payments at a rate set by the
3oard of State Lands and, further, ordering that the plaintiff,
Plateau Mining Company, owes penalties on delinquent royalties
pursuant to the regulation set by the Board.
Each of the parties have submitted their Memorandums
of Legal Points and Authorities and have presented to the Court
Affidavits and Exhibits which the Court has read and considered
and the Court heard oral arguments from the parties on February
16, 1988, and took this matter under advisement and rules on
the Motions as hereinafter stated.

Certain undisputed facts are, for the most part,
agreed upon by the parties as set forth in their respective
memorandums, and the Court will not attempt to detail all of
those undisputed facts.

There is no dispute as to the fact

that the plaintiff, Plateau, and their predecessors in interest
mined coal under a lease from the State of Utah during the
period April 1, 1979, to December 31, 1984, referred to as the
"audit period"; that the Lease was entered into on March 15,
1965, and that the Lease provides as follows:
"Article III, Second: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on
or before the 15th day of the month succeeding each quarter,
royalty
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000 lbs of coal
produced from the leased premises and sold or otherwise
disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing at the beginning of the
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leases of
land of similar cnaracter under coal leases issued by the
United States at that time,
whichever is higher. . . ."
That the lease was on a standard form provided by
and prepared by the State Land Board, and that throughout the
audit period the plaintiff, Plateau, or their predecessors in
interests, filed quarterly with the lessor (State) on a form
provided by the State a report of the coal mined under the
Lease and a calculation of the royalty due on the basis of 15C
per ton.

The payment was received and retained by the State

without question or objection throughout the audit period and

The royalty reporting form was provided by the Utah
Board of State Lands and under the title Royalty Data it has
two columns.

One is headed c/T Basis, and the other is headed

Percentage Basis.

Plateau and their predecessors in interest

filled in the column entitled c/T Basis and paid the amount of
royalty shown to be due under that column at 15c per ton and
left the other column blank.
After the term of the lease had expired, December
1984, in approximately February of 1985, the State undertook,
for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments.

The

audit was completed on or about May 29, 1985, and a demand was
sent to the plaintiffs for delinquent royalties in October of
1985.
It was the conclusion of the audit that the federal
government, during the audit period, was imposing a royalty on
coal leases of 8% of the value of the coal removed.

Based upon

the audit, the State made a demand upon the plaintiffs for the
payment of an additional $2,991,613.44 for delinquent
royalties, interest and penalties based upon 8% of Gross Sales
Value of coal removed.
Based upon an examination of the Lease and the
parties attempts to comply with its terms, and particularly the
expressed attitude of the various individuals whose
responsibility it was to enforce the Lease for and on behalf of
-4-

the state, the Court finds that as a matter of law the royalty
provision as contained in Article III, paragraph Second (b) of
the lease is ambiguous.
The royalty provision is divided into two parts.
Part (a) is definite and precise and is capable of definitive
determination and provides for 15 c per ton on coal produced
from the leased premises.
Part (b) leaves the amount due based on several
factors not immediately capable of definitive determination.
The ambiguity arises as much from what is not stated and
provided as from what is stated.

In other words, at the

beginning of the reporting quarter what is the prevailing
federal rat<=> and who makes that determination, the lessor or
the lessee, and what factors are to be included in making a
determination as what federal rate prevails and in what area is
it prevalent?

Who makes the determination that the land in the

State Lease and the land in the Federal Lease are similar in
character and what is the basis for determining similarity?
What tine period is used to determine federal leases "issued...
at that time" and who makes that determination?

Even if a

prevailing federal rate is established, does it apply to the
"value of the coal removed" as stated in the federal regulation
or to the "gross sales value" as used by the State auditor in
his assessment, and who makes that determination?

For these reasons, the Court has concluded
sub-paragraph

that

(b) is not self-executing as to create a legal

obligation on the lessee since the identifiable

factors

necessary for self-execution could not independently be
ascertained

by either

party.

Sub-paragraph
oenefit and since

(b) was written by the State for its

it is not self-executing,

it would

require

some affirmitive action on their part to bring the provision of
that sub-paragraph

into an enforceable position other than a

retroactive audit after having accepted the provisions of
sub-paragraph

(a) without objection or

comment.

Under these circumstances, the Court must look to
the prior conduct of the lessor and the lessees under the Lease
over a period of years that show that they chose to ingnore the
provisions of sub-paragraph

( b ) , and to calculate the royalty

under sub-paragraph ( a ) .
Since the State by an established course of conduct
for many years adopted a construction of the Lease that
provided

for 15c a ton, they are now precluded

from asserting a

different construction of the Lease where they took no
sufficient or positive action to establish
construction to an ambiguous

their now asserted

lease provision.

Because of the above legal conclusion, it would not
be necessary for the Court to go further, but as a further
-6-

ground for what the Court's final conclusion and ruling will
be, the Court will address other issues presented.
The Court is of the opinion that regardless of
whether the status of the land is School Trust Land or not, the
State acts in its proprietary capacity when it enters into a
contractual lease that is authorized under law and that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the State
and its Land Board as any other contracting individual.
The Court has concluded as a matter of law that the
State is estopped from demanding payment of royalty based upon
the 8% of value figure.

The undisputed facts show that the

State was aware of the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of
Article ill of their own Lease and were made aware by the
quarterly payments submitted by Plateau and its predecessors in
interest that those provisions were being ignored by leaving
that reporting column blank and by accepting, throughout the
auditing period, without question or objection, royalty based
upon 15c a ton.

If the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) were

going to be used, the State had a duty to speak which they did
not do.

By their conduct and failure to perform this duty,

they induced plaintiffs to believe that 15c a ton was the
acceptable royalty and plaintiffs, in reliance thereon,
continued to mine coal under the Lease which they would not
have done had they known that the defendants were going to
-7-

insist upon the 8% of value provision.

The great injustice

that would result to plaintiffs if we now allow the defendants
to assert this position, is quite obvious since the record
shows that to allow the irposition of the greater royalty, the
plaintiffs would show a substantial loss on all mining activity
under the State Lease.
Even if the concljsior. is reached that the defendants
were acting in a governmental capacity, they would still be
estopped from asserting the ne* royalty rate.

No substantial

adverse effect on public policy will result if the defendants
are estopped from applying this newly determined royalty
retroactively.

The State can

still proceed to lease coal lands

on any terms it feels profitable and that will give the State
the maximum return.

They still have the power to revise the

wording of their coal leases to c: away with any ambiguity and
to carry out any legally established policy.
Further, the record sr.ows that the plaintiffs would
not have entered into certain stock purchases and transfers on
the terms that were then agreed to had they known of the
State's position and the contemplated change in the royalty
provision as previously accepted, and that the plaintiffs would
suffer at this time great economic loss as a result.
The Court further finds that the State had no right
under the Lease to impose interest, except on delinquent

payments at the legal rate, or any penalty.

A legally binding

lease cannot be altered or added to by by rules and regulations
adopted subsequently.
The Lease does state that it is subject to such
operating rules and regulations as may be hereafter approved
and adopted.

Such a provision could not be interpreted to mean

changes to or additions of monetary payment.

"Operating Rules"

has reference to method of mining and can have no other logical
interpretation.

Since the amount claimed by the State is not

subject to definitive determination, any interest that may be
due could not commence to run until demand is made.
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as prayed for
and denies defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to
prepare a formal order in accordance with this opinion.
DATED this

^ / j . ,

Of February, 1988.

5?
/ ^

BOYD BtfNNELL, I^t:rict Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY That I mailed true and correct
copies of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT by depositing the same in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid to the following:
David L. Wilkinson
Utah State Attorney General
David S. Christensen
Assistant Attorney General
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Clark B. Allred
Gayle F. McKeachnie
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Special Assistant
Attorney General
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah
84078

James L. Elegante
Patricia J. winmill
Lucy B. Jenkins
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys at Law
1985 South State Street,
Suite 700
Post Office Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898

Calvin L. Rampton
Richard B. Johns
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& MCDONOUGH
Attorneys at Law
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

DATED this

_2

day of February, 1988.

Secretary

APPENDIX C

Calvin L. Rampton (USB #2682)
Richard B. Johns (USB #1706)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: , (801) 521-3200
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION
OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY;
THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS
AND FORESTRY; THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES; DEE
HANSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,

Civil No. 4847
Honorable Boyd Bunnell

Defendants.

Plaintiff, having moved for Partial Summary Judgment
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the Motion having been considered by the Court, and the Court
having considered the Uncontroverted Facts and Exhibits as set

forth in the agreed Pre-trial Order and having considered each
party's Memoranda of Legal Points and Authorities, and now
being well advised in the premises, hereby enters its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Uncontroverted Facts set forth in the Pre-trial
Order are accepted by the Court as established for purposes of
this case.

Based upon said Pre-trial Order the Court makes the

following findings of fact:
1.

Trail Mountain Coal Company and its predecessors

in interest mined coal under State Mineral Lease No. 22603 (the
H

LeaseM) during the period from 1979 through 1985.
2.

The Lease was on a standard form prepared by the

State Land Board.
3.

Article III of the Lease provides in pertinent

part as follows:
The Lessee, in consideration of the
granting of the rights and privileges
aforesaid, hereby covenants and agrees as
follows:
SECOND:. To pay Lessor quarterly, on or
before the 15th day of the month succeeding
each quarter, royalty
(a) at the rate of 15?f per ton of
2,000 lbs. of coal produced from the

-2-

leased premises and sold or otherwise
disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the
beginning of the quarter for which
payment is being made, for federal
lessees of land of similar character
under coal leases issued by the United
States at that time,
whichever is higher, . . .
4.

The state provided Trail Mountain Coal Company

and its predecessors with a form for reporting coal production
and royalties under the lease.
calculating royalties.

The form has two columns for

One column is headed <zf/T Basis and the

other is headed Percentage Basis.
5.

Throughout the period of mining, Trail Mountain

Coal Company and its predecessors filed the reporting form on a
quarterly basis with the State of Utah.

Trail Mountain Coal

Company and its predecessors calculated royalties by filling in
the column on the form labeled cf/Ton Basis, and paid the amount
of royalty shown to be due under that column at 15«f per ton of
coal produced.

The other column, labeled Percentage Basis, was

left blank on each form.
6.

Trail Mountain Coal Company and its predecessors

made royalty payments to the State of Utah for each quarter of
the years 1979 through 1985 during which coal was produced, on
the basis of 15«d per ton, as calculated on the reporting form.

-3-

7.

Each reporting form and each royalty payment was

received and retained by the State without question or
objection.
8.

At various times prior to and during the period

of mining, there was written and verbal correspondence between
the State of Utah and Trail Mountain Coal Company or its
predecessors, regarding the royalty provision of the Lease and
the amounts payable thereunder.
9.

The conduct of the Lessor and the Lessees under

the Lease over a period of years shows that they chose not to
.apply subparagraph (b) of the royalty provision, and to
calculate the royalty under subparagraph (a).
10.

In approximately March of 1985, the State

undertook, for the first time, an audit of the royalty payments.
11.

On or about October 15, 1985, the State provided

Trail Mountain Coal Company with a copy of the royalty audit,
and demanded payment for royalties it alleged to be delinquent.
12.

It was the conclusion of the audit that Trail

Mountain Coal Company and its predecessors should have been
paying royalties at the rate of 8% of the value of coal
removed.

Based upon the audit, the State made demand upon

Trail Mountain Coal Company for the payment of an additional
$5,222,197.20 for delinquent royalties, interest and penalties.

13.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the

Court now enters its Conclusions of Law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The royalty provision contained in Article III,

subparagraph (b) of the Lease, is ambiguous.
2.

Ambiguities in the Lease should be construed

against the State.
3.

The alternate royalty provision of subparagraph

(b) of the Lease is not self-executing so as to create a legal
obligation on the Lessee.
4.

Some affirmative action on the State's part other

than a retroactive audit was required to bring the alternate
royalty provision into an enforceable position.
5.

The Lease should be enforced in accordance with

the parties interpretation and course of conduct.
6.

Since the parties, by an established course of

conduct for many years, and by their interpretation of the
Lease, adopted a construction of the Lease that provided for
payment of royalties at the rate of 15^5 per ton, the State is
now precluded from asserting a different construction of the
Lease retroactively.

-5-

7.

Since the State took no sufficient or positive

action to establish the construction of the ambiguous Lease
provision which the State now asserts, the State is precluded
from doing so retroactively.
8.

The above Conclusions of Law are sufficient to

support a judgment granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.

Although it is not necessary for the Court

to go further, the Court also makes the following Conclusions
of Law.
9.

The State acted in a proprietary capacity in

entering into the Lease.
10.

The doctrine of estoppel may be applied against

the State.
11.

The State is estopped from demanding and

collecting royalty payments for coal mined under the Lease in
any amount greater than 15$$ per ton for the period from 1979
through 1985.
12.

The State had no right under the Lease to impose

interest, except on delinquent payments of the 15<zf per ton
royalty at the legal rate, or any penalty.
13.

Any interest that may be due on delinquent

payments does not commence to run until demand is made.
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14.

There is no dispute as to the material facts in

this case/ and plaintiff is entitled to Partial Summary
Judgment as prayed for.
DATED t h is
i

/?
x /

*?
'7

_t^z2liay of

/sAfA>r?'f.

1988.

/^Boyd ) Bunnell/ Drs-tfict Judge
/
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APPENDIX D

Calvin L. Rampton (USB #2682)
Richard B. Johns (USB #1706)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY; RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION
OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY;
THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS
AND FORESTRY; THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES; DEE
HANSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,

Civil No. 4847
Honorable Boyd Bunnell

Defendants.

Plaintiff having moved for Partial Summary Judgment
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the Motion having been considered by the Court, and the Court
having issued its decision granting the Motion of plaintiff and

denying the Motion of defendants, and good and sufficient cause
appearing therefore, the Court hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES:
1.

Defendants are not entitled to recover from

plaintiff any royalty amounts calculated at any rate higher
than 15d per ion of coal produced from Stare Coal Lease
No. ML-22603 during the period from 1979 through 1985.
2.

Interest due on any delinquent royalties payable

under State Coal Lease No. ML-22603 only begins to accrue when
demand for payment of the delinquent royalties is made, and
then accrues at the statutory legal rate of interest.
3.

The parties hereto shall bear their respective

costs and attorneys' fees.
DATED this 3rd

day of

August

1988.

BY THE COURT:

/s/

BOYD BUNNELL

Boyd Bunnell
District Judge
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APPENDIX. E

LEGISLATIVE CENEAAL COUNSEL
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE
OPINION NO. 077-011)
Data:

April I, 1977

Subjact:

Royalty on Stata Coal Leases

Requested by:

Lennis Knighton
Lagislativa Auditor Ganaral

Opinion by:

Stavan W. Allred
Staff Attorney
Offica of Lagislativa Canaral Counsel

Conclusion:

1*

•Prevailing prica" means "market price;"

2.

"Leases Issued" im£%z% to currently issue

3.

"Land of similar character" is sufficiently

leases;

vague to defy definition; and
4.

The state poMB%%%%% the authority to increase

the royalty on coal leases to a level equal to the current rate
of federal leases.
ANALYSIS
1.

As used in Article III, SECOND, (c) , of the attached

lease, the term "prevailing price" means the market price or the
price generally prevailing in the locality for similar production.
The prevailing price is a price set in the usual course of business,
without undue enlargement of costs and with a reasonable profit.
2.

As used in Article Z2I, SECOND, (c), of the attached

lease, the term "leases issued" refers those leases issued "at
the time" that the royalty payments are due.

Since those pay-

ments are due monthly, it is reasonable to believe that the
leases referred to are leases currently issued.
3.

As used in Article XII, SECOND, (c), of the attached

lease, the term "land of similar eharaeter" is so vague as to >
defy reasonable definition. / Initially the problem becomes one
of kind, i.e. similar in what regard —

sixe, productivity, value.

Assuming, arguendo* th*e simllA^lty ean.bi •fc«611«htd,

the second problem arises when it is attempted to establish
the magnitude of the lands available for comparison i.e. doVfc
the land have to be similar to Jand in the same cbunty, state,
region or is the entire United States available for eoaparitive
similarities.
Without further explanation in the lease itself or withou
knowing the intent of the parties, *ny definition given herein
would be totally inconclusive.
4.

The state has, pursuant to Article 211, SECOND, (c)

the authority to increase the royalty rate to a level equal to
the current federal rate.

The three rate structures set in

Article XII, SECOND, are alternative rates end it should be
noted that (c) specifically indicates that the lessor shall pay
whichever rate is higher.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of October,
1988, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff/Respondent
Trail Mountain Coal Company, to the following parties of record:
David L. Wilkinson
UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
David S. Christensen
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Clark B. Allred
Gayle F. McKeachnie
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Special Assistant Attorney General
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
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